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Abstract. In this paper we introduce a model for studying meet-in-the-middle attacks on block ci-
phers, and a simple block cipher construction provably resistant to such attacks in this model. A side-
result of this is a proper formalization for an unproven alternative to DESX proposed by Kilian and
Rogaway; this construction can now be shown to be sound in our model. Meet-in-the-middle attacks
exploit weaknesses in key schedule algorithms, and building constructions resistant to such attacks
is an important issue for improving the security of block ciphers. Our construction is generic so that
it can be used on top of any block cipher, and it does not require to increase the key-length. We use
an exposure resilient function (or ERF) as a building block and we propose a concrete and efficient
instantiation strategy based on compression functions.
Keywords: Block cipher, meet-in-the-middle attack, provable security, exposure resilient function.
1 Introduction
In the area of block cipher design, much work up to now has been devoted to proving resistance
to classical statistical attacks like standard linear anddifferential cryptanalysis (see e.g. [32,37,13]).
However, resistance to attacks that exploit weaknesses of the key schedule has remainedmainly
unaddressed. These attacks consist principally in meet-in-the-middle (MiTM) [15] and related-
key attacks [4].
A typical good design criterion for key schedules is to have a highminimal distance between
expanded keys; performance is also often another issue, and key schedules are expected to be
fast, so as not to impact too much the encryption of small messages. An additional criterion
could be for the key schedule to be non-linear, although many (good) key schedules are in fact
linear. These design principles, however, do not really amount to a theory comparable to the
one devoted to resistance to statistical attacks. Nonetheless, a few works study the security of
key schedules with respect to related-key attacks from amore theoretical perspective [30,29,12].
Meet-in-the-middle attacks are an important technique available to the cryptanalysts study-
ing symmetric primitives. It is important to avoid such attacks since unlike statistical attacks
they usually have low data requirements. Beyond the classical result on double-encryption (see
e.g. [15]), MiTM attacks are effective at exploiting weaknesses in the key schedule algorithms
of block ciphers or the message expansion of hash functions. In the context of block ciphers,
MiTM attacks are the most efficient attacks on many ciphers: round-reduced version of IDEA
[5], round-reduced version of AES [14,17,9], or the full GOST [20]. Furthermore, a MiTM phase is
usually used to extend the number of rounds reached by a statistical attack, as seen for instance
in the attacks of Biham and Shamir [6] and of Matsui [28] on the DES. Finally, the recent biclique
attack is a MiTM-related technique useful to speed up exhaustive search. Bicliques were found
to be successful against AES and IDEA [7,22]. In the context of hash functions, MiTM techniques
may be used to find preimages; this was for instance the case for attacks on MD4 [25,2], MD5 [36,2],
or AES in a hash function setting [35].
⋆ A short version of this paper is to appear in the proceedings of IMA CC 2013. This is the full version, with the
complete proof of Thm. 2.
Our Contributions. In this paper, we develop a simple model for meet-in-the-middle attacks
and propose a generic block cipher construction that is provably resistant to such attacks in this
model. The idea behind our model is simple and based on the fact that many MiTM attacks on
block ciphers can be seen as decomposing the cipher into two sub-ciphers, and then applying
the classicalMiTMattack on double-encryption (inmore recent variations, the cryptanalystmay
also guess part of the key or part of the intermediate state [20,16]). Hence we argue that studying
a construction in the sole context of double-encryption is actuallymeaningful for studyingmany
types of MiTM attacks on a single cipher vulnerable to such attacks. However our goal is not to
study constructions actually based on double-encryption (such as for instance the double XOR-
cascade [19], cf. below). This is because such constructions already lend themselves to meet-in-
the-middle attacks even when the underlying cipher(s) does not; our objective is different and
consists in obtaining a construction resistant toMiTMwhen the underlying cipher is not. Studying
the construction with a composition of two ciphers as an underlying primitive is therefore only
amean of simulating the construction applied to a single cipher that is vulnerable tomeet-in-the-
middle attacks.
Our construction relies on a core (or internal) cipher and on a form of whitening. Let E k be
the core cipher of key k, and f a function with good enough properties, then define a new cipher
EFk (p), E k (p⊕ f (k))⊕ f (k).
Themain idea behind this construction is to force an attacker to commit to a value for the whole
key before being able to exploit any data he may have access to, thereby making it impossible to
work separately on parts of the key1. A similar idea can be found for instance in the operation
mode of the SHA-3 candidate SIMD [26]: the goal in this context was to make message modifica-
tion techniques à laWang impossible by forcing the attacker to commit to a specific value of the
message, before the message expansion phase. We prove that meet-in-the-middle attacks are
not effective against the EF cipher; this is achieved by upper-bounding themaximum advantage
of an attacker of the above construction in a double-encryption setting (when E is a cascade of
two ciphers), and showing that it is less than the advantage of a meet-in-the-middle adversary.
We do this with a method adapted from Kilian and Rogaway’s proof on DESX, and justify for-
mally how this is relevant when the construction is applied to a single cipher on which MiTM
attacks may be performed. We also discuss how the construction can be instantiated efficiently
in practice.
Related Work. We can distinguish two kinds of works on provable security for block ciphers:
proving a property for some high-level and generic construction, or proving the resistance of an
actual cipher to more specific attacks. Our work clearly belongs to the first category, whereas
from the second we can cite e.g. the provable resistance of block ciphers to classical linear and
differential cryptanalysis. Our approach is generic so that it can be used on top of any cipher; it
is for instance similar to some proposals for building tweakable block ciphers [27].
Similar-looking constructions have already been proposed in the literature, but with a dis-
tinct motivation of extending the equivalent key length of the core primitive. One such construc-
tion is the DESX (or its more generic name ‘FX’) construction, proposed by Rivest and formally
proved by Kilian and Rogaway [24]. It can be described as taking a cipher E k under the key k,
and defining a new cipher
EXk,k1,k2(p), E k (p⊕k1)⊕k2.
Amore recent development is the aforementioned double XOR-cascade of Gaži and Tessaro [19].
This construction is based on a cipher E and defines a new cipher 2XOR as:
2XORk,k1(p), E k˜ (E k (p⊕k1)⊕k1),
1 Or alternatively to force the attacker to guess the value of the whitening independently of the key.
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where k˜ is a key related to k (the authors suggest flipping one bit of k). However, this requires
two calls to the cipher E , and therefore cannot readily be used in our context. The main differ-
ence between the above constructions and ours is that we do not aim for a bigger equivalent key
length, and derive all the whitening keys from the original key to E . We also study our construc-
tion specifically in the context of resistance to meet-in-the-middle attacks.
Interestingly, Kilian and Rogaway briefly mention a construction that can be seen as an in-
stantiation of ours. Their purpose was to define an alternative to the FX construction that gives
more flexibility in the choice of the key length to the user. Instead of using independent keys
k,k1,k2, they suggest deriving them from an arbitrarily-long key kˆ, as the (truncated) output of
f (kˆ), f 1(kˆ), and f 2(kˆ) respectively, where f , f 1, f 2 are defined as SHA-1 prefixed with three differ-
ent constants. Once again the motivation is different from ours, and no proof nor formalization
is given for this construction. Note that as a consequence of our results, it is possible to prove
that this construction is sound.
Outline of the Paper. We present our model for studying meet-in-the-middle attacks in §2 and
our construction in §3. We prove the resistance of the construction to the attacks captured by
our model in §4. We discuss our result and its implications on advanced meet-in-the-middle
techniques in §5, and instantiation issues in §6.
2 AModel for Meet-in-the-Middle Attacks
2.1 Generic Constructions
The aim of our work is to define constructions resistant to MiTM attacks. We define here what
wemean by construction andwhat kinds of constructions we specifically consider. We first recall
the definition of a block cipher.
Definition 1 A block cipher is a mapping E : {0,1}κ× {0,1}n → {0,1}n such that ∀k ∈ {0,1}κ, E (k, ·)
(also noted E k (·)) is a permutation. The first and second arguments of E are called the key and
message (block) respectively. The variables κ and n denote the key size (or length) and block size
(idem) of E .
Definition 2 A single-cipher construction is a block cipher E : {0,1}κ× {0,1}n → {0,1}n that can be
described as the compositionPost◦E ◦Pre of functionsPre, E , andPost, where E : {0,1}κ
′
×{0,1}n →
{0,1}n is a block cipher. The functions Pre and Post may take both of E ’s inputs as arguments,
that is the key and the message. A ν-cipher construction is a block cipher that can be described
as the composition Post(ν) ◦E (ν) ◦Pre(ν) ◦Post(ν−1) ◦· · · ◦E (1) ◦Pre(1) where the ciphers E (i ) use in-
dependent keys, and where the Pre(i ) and Post(i ) functions may take any of these keys as inputs. A
ν-cipher construction of the specific form Post◦E (ν) ◦E (ν−1) ◦· · · ◦ E (1) ◦Pre is called a ν∗-cipher
construction. Any single-cipher construction can be extended to a ν∗-cipher construction in a
straightforward way.
In this paper, we consider the EF construction, defined in §3, which is a single-cipher construc-
tion. It is thus generic, and can be used both with already-existing algorithms, and as a basis to
design a cipher ex nihilo.
2.2 TheModel
Our goal in this section is to give a formal model for MiTM attacks that allows to prove security
properties. We later use thismodel to prove the resistance of the EF construction to such attacks.
This model does not capture the concept of any MiTM attack, but it does nonetheless take into
account a significant class.
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The idea behind our model is that a MiTM attack on, say, cipher E often performs a concep-
tual decomposition of E into two sub-ciphers, with separate key bits. We can thus model such
attacks as being performed on a double-encryption construction with two independent ciphers,
seen as black-boxes. This allows us to consider MiTM attacks against generic ciphers. We detail
this argument in the remainder of this section.
The Classical Meet-in-the-Middle Attack on Double Encryption. Let us consider the cipher E ,
defined as the composition of the two independent ciphersF andG , operating on independent
keys k1 and k2 respectively. We denote by E k (p) the action of encrypting the plaintext p with E
and key k and producing the ciphertext c. By definition of E , we have E k (p),G k2(F k1(p)), with
k1 and k2 uniquely defined by k.
The MiTM attack on double-encryption exploits the fact that k1 and k2 are used indepen-
dently in their respective ciphers; in its simplest form, it can be described as follows:
Get a known plaintext p and its corresponding ciphertext c.
for every possible candidate k i1 for key k1 do
Compute y i ,F k i1(p) and store the result in memory.
end for
for every possible candidate k
j
2 for key k2 do
Compute y ′ j ,G−1
k
j
2
(c) and store the result in memory.
end for
for every y i = y ′ j do
Output (k i1,k
j
2 ) as a candidate for (k1,k2).
end for
This procedure may be repeated until only one candidate for k1 and k2 remains, using many
plaintext/ciphertext pairs. If we call κ the size of the keys k1 and k2 in bits, the cost of the attack
is then of the order 2κ in time and memory, which is much lower than the 22κ time that brute-
force search on k would cost. If k1 and k2 are of different size κ1 and κ2, one needs only to store
the candidates for the smaller size, e.g. in a hash table, and the candidates for the bigger key size
can be computed on the fly. The general cost of this attack is thus of the order of max(2κ1 ,2κ2) in
time, and min(2κ1 ,2κ2) in memory.
This attack can still be applied when k1 and k2 are not independent but have only some of
their bits in common. In that case, one just needs to guess the commonbits and repeat the above
procedure for every guess.
AModel forMeet-in-the-MiddleAttacks onaSingleCipher. MiTMattacks are in noway limited
to double-encryption; in fact they are well-suited to iterated ciphers with weak key schedules.
However, the ideas involved in a MiTM attack on a single cipher are essentially the same as for
attacking double-encryption.
Let us consider an iterated cipher E with round function ρi for round i : we define E k (p) as
the composition ρr
kr
◦· · · ◦ρ1
k1
(p), where r is the number of iterations of the round function, and
the ki ’s are round keys generated from k by a key schedule. The idea behind a MiTM attack on
E is to find two sets kα and kβ of consecutive round keys such that they involve strictly different
bits of k. In other words we have kα, {ki , · · · ,ki+ j }, kβ, {ki+ j+1, · · · ,ki+ j+1+k }, with kα∩kβ =;
(when the intersection is taken over the bits of k found in kα and kβ). Once these sets are found, it
is possible to guess independently the bits of k present in kα and the ones present in kβ, in a way
exactly similar as for double-encryption. That is, finding the sets is equivalent to conceptually
decompose (a part of) E in two sub-cipherswith independent keys, onwhich double-encryption
is performed: we have E k = (ρ
i+ j+1+k ◦· · · ◦ρi+ j+1)kβ ◦ (ρ
i+ j ◦· · · ◦ρi )kα (although this equality is
true only if i = 1 and i + j +1+k = r . This constraint can easily be waved, however, if we restrict
ourselves to finding sub-ciphers for a round-reduced version of E ).
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Weare now ready to formalize ourmodel.We start by stating the security of double-encryption
with ideal ciphers, thanks to a theorem of Aiello et al. [1]2.
Theorem 1 ([1]) Let F : {0,1}κ × {0,1}n → {0,1}n be an ideal block cipher. For any κ,n, t ,q ≥ 1,
where t and q denote the number of oracle access to F and F−1, and F ◦F respectively, then the
maximum advantage of any adversary At ,q trying to distinguish F ◦F from a random permuta-
tion with resources t and q is upper-bounded by t2/22κ. This bound is tight up to a constant factor
as long as q is not too small.
We allow ourselves to use a more general expression of this result when considering double-
encryption of not necessarily equal ciphers F and G , of not necessarily equal key lengths κ1
and κ2, where t1 and t2 denote the number of oracle access to F and G
−1 respectively. In this
case, we use the upper-bound t1 ·t2/2κ1+κ23. We now define the notion of constructions resistant
to MiTM attacks.
Definition 3 Let F : {0,1}κ1 × {0,1}n → {0,1}n and G : {0,1}κ2 × {0,1}n → {0,1}n be two block ci-
phers. A two-cipher construction E(F ,G ) is said to be resistant to the meet-in-the-middle attack
if the maximum advantage of any adversary A trying to distinguish E(F ,G ) from a random per-
mutation is:
max
A
AdvE(F ,G )(At1+t2,q ) < t1 · t2/2
κ1+κ2 ,
up to constant factors.
This definition is made meaningful by the tightness of the bound of theorem 1. Essentially, it
says that a two-cipher construction is resistant to meet-in-the-middle attacks if no adversary
can distinguish it with an advantage that is at least as good as the best one it could get if only
composition of the two ciphers were used instead.
Definition 4 Let E : {0,1}κ× {0,1}n → {0,1}n be a block cipher. A single-cipher construction E(E )
is said to be resistant to the meet-in-the-middle attack if for any two block ciphers F : {0,1}κ1 ×
{0,1}n → {0,1}n and G : {0,1}κ2 × {0,1}n → {0,1}n such that E = G ◦F and κ = κ1+κ2, the maxi-
mum advantage of any adversary A trying to distinguish E(E ) from a random permutation is:
max
A
AdvE(E )(At1+t2,q ) < t1 · t2/2
κ1+κ2 ,
up to constant factors.
In other words, this means that the best attack on the construction E(E ) is strictly worse than the
best meet-in-the-middle attack on E . Our model is justified by the next proposition:
Proposition 1 Let E be a two∗-ciphers construction resistant to the meet-in-the-middle attack.
Then the restriction of E to a single cipher is a single-cipher construction resistant to the meet-in-
the-middle attack.
Proof. This is a direct consequence of definitions 3 and 4. ⊓⊔
Hence, the resistance of a single-cipher construction to MiTM attacks can be studied by analyz-
ing its two∗-ciphers variant. In practice, we perform this analysis in the ideal block ciphermodel
[3,24].
2 The result is stated in the specific case where the two ciphers are equal.
3 Although in practice, we actually study our construction in the case of κ1 = κ2, and therefore wewill really be using
exactly the same bound as in the main result of [1].
5
3 A Construction Resistant toMeet-in-the-Middle Attacks
Wenow formally define our construction.We start by introducing the notion ofExposure-Resilient
Functions (or ERF), as defined by Canetti et al. [11]. ERFs are similar to all or nothing transforms,
which were introduced by Rivest [34].
Definition 5 An ℓ-ERF is amapping f : {0,1}α→ {0,1}β such that for randomvalues r , R in {0,1}α,
{0,1}β; for any L ∈
{α
ℓ
}
, the distributions 〈[r ]L¯ , f (r )〉 and 〈[r ]L¯ ,R〉 are indistinguishable one from
another; where
{α
ℓ
}
denotes the set of subsets of {1 . . .α} of size ℓ, and for x ∈ {0,1}α, [x]L¯ denotes x
restricted to its bits not in L.
Here, we will consider particularly weak ERFs, in the sense that when less than ℓ bits of r are
unknown to the adversary, he is then supposed to be able to predict the value of f (r ′) for any
r ′ that fixes the unknown bits of r to some value. However, we will mostly consider degenerate
cases where ℓ is zero. That is, the output of the ERF is indistinguishable from random until all of
its input is revealed. Constructions of ERFs are known to exist in the standard model [11], and it
is trivial to see that a random oracle meets the definition of a zero-ERF. Hence, from a practical
point of view, a zero-ERF can be instantiated by a hash function, in the random oracle model.
We now define our construction, which we will note EF for short.
Definition 6 Let E : {0,1}κ× {0,1}n → {0,1}n be a block cipher. We write E k (p) , c the action of
encrypting the plaintext p with E under the key k, to produce the ciphertext c. Let f : {0,1}κ →
{0,1}n be an ℓ-ERF. Then we define the EF construction with core cipher E as EFk (p) , E k (p⊕
f (k))⊕ f (k), where ‘⊕’ denotes bitwise exclusive or.
Our goal is to prove the resistance of this construction toMiTM attacks. According to ourmodel,
wewill study this construction as a two-ciphers construction. That is, we instantiateE k byG k2 ◦F k1 .
In this case, the EF construction applied to E can be written as:
EF(k1,k2)(p),G k2(F k1(p⊕ f (k1,k2)))⊕ f (k1,k2).
4 Resistance of the EF Construction toMeet-in-the-Middle Attacks
In this section, we prove an upper-bound on the advantage of an adversary trying to distin-
guish the EF two-ciphers construction froma randompermutation, in function of the number of
queriesmade to different oracles. The boundweobtain shows that our construction significantly
improves the resistance of double-encryption to generic attacks such as the classical MiTM, and
hence is resistant to the MiTM attack, in the terminology of definitions 3 and 4.
4.1 Security Model
Weconsider the EF two-ciphers construction applied toG ◦F , whereF : {0,1}κ1×{0,1}n → {0,1}n
and G : {0,1}κ2 × {0,1}n → {0,1}n are ideal block ciphers [3,24]: for each key k1 (resp. k2), the
mapF k1 (resp. G k2) is a permutation randomly chosen from the setΠn of all (2
n)! permutations
operating on words of size n. For ease of presentation, and without loss of generality, we assume
that κ1 = κ2, κ. The ‘f ’ function used in EF is an ℓ-ERF with ℓ small. We consider an adversary
who is given access to four oracles:
– Two of them are F and G ; when provided with a key k ′1 (resp. k
′
2) of size κ and an input x
(resp. y) of size n, they return the result y (resp. z) of encrypting x (resp. y) with F (resp. G )
with key k ′1 (resp. k
′
2). Queries to the inverse oracles F
−1 and G−1 are permitted, and are not
distinguished from regular queries. That is, if F (x), y has been queried, we consider that
F
−1(y), x has also been queried, and conversely.
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– One oracle gives an access to f , and when provided with an input of size 2κ bits, returns the
result of size n of the evaluation of f on this input.
– The last oracle, which we call U , takes as input a plaintext p and returns either EF(p), with
EF instantiated withF ,G , and f with fixed, randomly chosen keys k1 and k2; or the image of
p from a fixed permutation π randomly selected from the set Πn . Again, queries to U
−1 are
permitted.
Each access to an oracle will be counted and expressed by the following variables:
– The number of accesses to U is denoted by D. They represent the amount of data available
to the adversary.
– The number of accesses to F and F−1 (resp. G and G−1) is denoted by q1 (resp. q2).
– The number of accesses to f is denoted by qf .
The goal of the adversary is to distinguish between U being π or the EF construction. We
define the advantage of an adversary as its probability of successfully distinguishing the two
instantiations of U . More formally:
Definition 7 Let Πn be the set of permutations on words of size n; let us note x
R
←S the action of
randomly choosing an object x from the set S ; let us denote by AEF and Aπ the answer, 0 or 1, of
an adversary A with access to the aforementioned oracles, when U is the EF construction and a
randomly chosen permutation respectively. Then the advantage AdvA of the adversary A is defined
as:
AdvA,
Pr
[
∀k ′1 ∈ {0,1}
κ,F k ′1
R
←Πn ;∀k ′2 ∈ {0,1}
κ,G k ′2
R
←Πn ;π
R
←Πn : Aπ = 1
]
−
Pr
[
∀k ′1 ∈ {0,1}
κ,F k ′1
R
←Πn ;∀k ′2 ∈ {0,1}
κ,G k ′2
R
←Πn ;k1
R
← {0,1}κ;k2
R
← {0,1}κ : AEF = 1
]
.
Our objective is to bound this advantage for any adversary A in function of the number of
queries he has made to the oracles. We note Adv(ℓ,D,q1,q2,qf ) the advantage of any adversary
having made less thanD, q1, q2, and qf queries to the oracles, when f is an ℓ-ERF.
Notations.
– A key candidate for F (resp. G ) is denoted by k ′1 (resp. k
′
2). Those are keys for which the
adversary makes queries to the oracles awaiting a key as part of their inputs.
Moreover, we may count the accesses to those oracles when queried with a specific key. The
number of accesses to F (resp. G , f ) with key k ′1 (resp. k
′
2, (k
′
1,k
′
2)) is written q1(k
′
1) (resp.
q2(k ′2), qf (k
′
1,k
′
2)).
Furthermore, the number of queries to the F (resp. G ) oracle with key k ′1 (resp. k
′
2) and for a
specific message p is noted q1(k ′1,p) (resp. q2(k
′
2,p)).
– If U has been instantiated with EF, the key used in the instantiation for F (resp. G ) is de-
noted by k1 (resp. k2). For ease of presentation, we will consider it valid to talk about those
keys even when it is not clear if U is instantiated with EF.
– Wedenote by x, y , z, the intermediate values p⊕f (k1,k2),F k1(p⊕f (k1,k2))), andG k2(F k1(p⊕
f (k1,k2))) respectively.
– Wemake use of an indicator function, written 1. We have 1(x)= 0 if and only if x is zero, and
it is one otherwise. This may be extended to sets, where 1(x)= 0 if and only if x is the empty
set, and is one otherwise.
– The concatenation of words x and y is noted x||y , the Hamming weight of a word x is de-
noted by hw(x).
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4.2 The Result
Our main result about the security of the EF construction is summarized by the following theo-
rem.
Theorem 2 The advantage Adv(ℓ,D,q1,q2,qf ) of an adversary trying to distinguish EF from a
random permutation is upper-bounded by:
2−2κmax
(
2ℓ
(
n
ℓ
)
·qf , 2
−n
·D
∑
k ′1,k
′
2
min(q1(k
′
1),q2(k
′
2))
)
. (1)
One can see that to gain an advantage of one, an adversary with D available data needs at
least 2
2κ
2ℓ(nℓ)
or 2
κ+n
D
queries to the oracles, whichever is the smallest. For ℓ = 0, n = κ, and D = 1,
these two terms are equal to 22κ; in the case of double-encryption without the EF construction,
one would only need of the order of 2κ queries. This result immediately implies the following
corollary:
Corollary 1 The two∗-ciphers and single-cipherEF construction is resistant tomeet-in-the-middle
attacks, in the terminology of definitions 3 and 4, as long as D < 2n (i.e. the adversary does not
have access to the whole codebook).
Proof. For small values of ℓ, and when D < 2n , Adv(ℓ,D,q1,q2,qf ) is strictly smaller than the
bound of definitions 3 and 4. ⊓⊔
The restriction thatD< 2n is important, and comes frommore general properties of FX-like con-
structions. In particular, such a construction cannot be used in all generality in order to increase
the equivalent key length of a block cipher, as the key length cannot be shown to be more than
the one of the core cipher when all the codebook is available to the adversary. This is the case for
the original construction of DESX, and remains true in ourmodified setting when the core cipher
is a 2-cascade (i.e. a composition of two ciphers). In the latter case, the double XOR-cascade of
Gaži andTessarodoes increase the effective key length of the (modified) 2-cascade.However, as it
has already been noted, we want our construction to be applicable to a single cipher as well, and
therefore cannot use one similar to theirs. The above restriction notwithstanding, we believe that
our construction is still interesting in practice. The first reason is that attacks where the adver-
sary uses the whole codebook would not only be of limited interest to the attacker, they can also
be made asymptotically as expensive as the designer of the cipher wishes to; so big an amount
of data is also fairly unrealistic for many ciphers with big block sizes (e.g. 128 bits). The second
reason is that raising the data complexity of a MiTM attack from the information-theoretically
lower-bound to the whole codebook, for an adversary to get the same time complexity, is in itself
a huge improvement of the resistance to MiTM attacks.
4.3 Proof Sketch
We outline here the strategy used for proving theorem 2, while the full proof is given in the ap-
pendix.
Given the similarities between the EF and FX constructions and their security models, our
proof has a structure close to the one of Kilian and Rogaway [24]. In particular, we use games for
each oracle to define the situations where an adversary may distinguish the instantiation of the
U oracle (we do not fully redefine the games in this paper, though, and refer to [24] for a more
detailed description). For each such situation, we then bound the probability of the distinction
being possible in function of the past queries made by the adversary. We bound separately the
advantage of an adversary trying to find distinguishing situations for the three oracles,F ,G , and
U , and then combine these bounds together with the bound of the advantage over f to produce
a general result.
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It should be noticed that we do not need to consider situations for the “inverse” oracles (such
as e.g.F−1), as the constraints possibly put on the input/output pairs of queries to those oracles
are simply swappedwhen compared to the ones for the “forward” oracles (an input of an inverse
oracle being an output for the corresponding forward oracle). Therefore, the advantage when
distinguishing inverse oracles is not different from when considering forward oracle.
The main difference between our proof and the one of [24] is that, from the structure of the
construction, an adversary has essentially the choice of guessing the output of the f function
directly (thereby seeing f (k1,k2) as a third independent key), or via its inputs and the properties
of f . This shows in the bound of theorem 2 as the two arguments of the maximum function.
Because our construction is more complex than FX, we also have more oracles to consider.
5 Discussion
In the previous section, we have shown that the EF construction increases the resistance of a ci-
pher to “classical” MiTM attacks. We now argue that this improved resistance carries on to more
advancedMiTM techniques, which further increases the relevance and interest of the construc-
tion. We also address the relevance of our ideal-cipher-based model.
5.1 About Ideal Ciphers
As pointed above, our proof uses the ideal cipher model. This could be seen as limiting the rel-
evance of the applications we claim—building constructions resistant to MiTM attacks— as we
use a setting where the best attack on the sub-ciphers is basically brute-force.
We claim that this is not a limitation. Using ideal ciphers allows one to express bounds in
terms of number of queries to the relevant oracles: the cost of each query is of little importance
in so far as it is bounded by a constant. In other words, our results show that the EF construction
increases the security of double-encryption by ensuring that an adversary needs to performmore
queries to the oracles to gain an advantage comparable to the one he would get when the con-
struction is not used. Whether the queries are expensive or not (i.e. whether the best attacks on
the sub-ciphers is brute-force or not) does not change the asymptotic increase of security that
one can expect by choosing a bigger key or block size. This is as much valid for the sub-ciphers
decomposition of a MiTM attack on single cipher as for double-encryption.
Another concern might be that actual MiTM attacks do not typically perform a full decom-
position of the attacked cipher in two sub-ciphers with independent keys. This is indeed an ideal
case for the attacker which is seldommet in practice. However, real attacks that do not conform
to this ideal case are typically less powerful, while still needing a decomposition in two sub-
ciphers at some point; hence our construction increases the security against these real attacks
as well.
5.2 The Splice-and-Cut Exception
Before going on to the expected advantages of the EF construction, we should mention one sit-
uation where it does not seem to be useful, i.e. when protecting against splice-and-cut MiTM
attacks.
A splice-and-cutMiTM attack uses a conceptual decomposition of a cipher with sub-ciphers
thatmay be defined by considering the first and last round of the attacked cipher as consecutive.
That is, we consider decompositions of say, E , that can be written as, say G 2 ◦F ◦G 1. In order to
perform this variant of the MiTM attack, the attacker typically guesses one intermediate value
at the boundary between the two sub-ciphers using different key subsets, and then queries the
plaintext or ciphertext corresponding to the encryption or decryption of this value for a given
sub-key candidate. With data obtained this way, it is then easy to perform aMiTM attack.
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It is possible to adapt our model to the conceptual decomposition used in a splice-and-cut
attack. However, because this attack typically requires thewhole code-book to be performed, the
bound that would be obtained by a generalization of theorem 2 would not show any improved
resistance. It might be that improved resistance to the splice-and-cut MiTM could be shown by
leaving the information-theoretic view of the ideal cipher model, but this does not seem to be
an easy task.
In the end, because of their huge data requirements, splice-and-cut MiTM are more suited
to attacking hash functions, and are seldom used against block ciphers. Consequently, we think
that the impact of the EF construction not being efficient against them is somewhat limited in
its targeted applications.
5.3 Taking Advanced Attack Techniques into Account
We now discuss the issue of including somemore advanced MiTM techniques used by cryptan-
alysts in our proof that the EF construction increases the resistance of a single cipher to MiTM
attacks. We discuss this for two important techniques: the initial structure of Sasaki and Aoki
[36], and its later generalization to bicliques by Khovratovich et al. [23].
Initial Structure. This is an advanced techniques that may be used in order to increase the
number of rounds reached by an existing MiTM attack. It consists in finding an initial structure
between two sub-ciphers of the MiTM attack that use, say, key subsets k1 and k2 respectively.
The structure consists itself in a sub-cipher that can be computed thanks to the key subsets
k ′1 ⊆ k1 and k
′
2 ⊆ k2, but with the key bits from k
′
2 being used before the bits of k
′
1 in the structure
(otherwise the relevant parts of the initial structure can be included in the two sub-ciphers of
theMiTM). Finding initial structures givesmore flexibility to the attacker in thematching phase,
leading tomore powerful attacks. For instance, they were key in finding the first preimage attack
on the full MD5 [36].
In order to be applicable, the initial structure technique still needs the cipher under attack
to be decomposed in two sub-ciphers. The added sophistication of thematching phase typically
allows the attacker to define a decomposition that covers more rounds of the full cipher than
what he would obtain without using the initial structure. Yet this does not change the fact that
the attacker needs to test the key candidates for both sub-ciphers. What the bounds on the EF
construction say is that it is impossible to use a MiTM technique to do this efficiently, because
of the increased number of queries that have to be made to the sub-ciphers (and possibly to
the f function) in order to test all possible keys and get an advantage of one; this is completely
independent of the number of rounds covered by the sub-ciphers.
In essence, the initial structure technique allows an attacker to find better decompositions,
but it does not improve the key-testing phase per se. Therefore we claim that the EF construction
still improves the security of a cipher against adversaries using initial structures: however good
the decomposition of the initial cipher theymay get, the construction layer will prevent efficient
use of it.
Bicliques. This is a generalization of the previous technique that allows for a more systematic
way to construct initial structures, instead of searching them manually as was done originally.
In its simplest form, the biclique technique can be seen as a way to extend an existing (splice-
and-cut) MiTM attack by constructing bicliques between intermediate states in order to cover
the rounds not included in the existing attack. Again, this leads to more powerful attacks, and
this technique has successfully been used to analyze several hash functions and block ciphers
such as Skein [23], AES [7], or IDEA [22].
Again, for this technique to be applicable, finding a decomposition in sub-ciphers is nec-
essary. Hence, even if the biclique parts themselves are not something that is captured in our
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analysis, it is still the case for the decomposition: for a given decomposition of given parameters
size, the bound on the number of queries to the sub-ciphers necessary to gain a given advantage
is not changed by the presence of bicliques. The interest of the EF construction in this case is
again to ensure that no decomposition can be efficiently used, either alone or as part of a wider
attack.
This analysis and its arguments is similar to the one thatwas performedon the recent PRINCE
cipher in order to assess its resistance to bicliques [8].
Summary. We did not formalize the arguments presented in this section, and it does not seem
to be easy to do so. In addition, although we think that an increased resistance to the MiTM
phase is an important step towards some sort of provable security against these techniques, the
interest of that in the case of actual designs might be somewhat more limited. The reason is
that if these techniques allow to efficiently use a decomposition with small parameters size as
part of a bigger attack, the increased resistance to the MiTM phase might not impact the overall
complexity significantly. This might be a concern when resistance to e.g. bicliques is considered.
In the end, much work still needs to be done in order to better understand how to resist
advancedMiTM techniques, and this is far beyond the scope of this paper. Yet we believe that an
increased resistance to even just the basicMiTMattack should be an important part of this work,
much as resisting standard statistical attacks is an important part of modern cipher design.
5.4 Alternatives for the Construction
We end this section by outlining three alternatives for the EF construction that differ with the
main proposal in the way the output of the f function is combined with the input of the core
cipher.
A first obvious variation is to use modular addition instead of XOR.
Definition 8 Let f : {0,1}κ → {0,1}n be an ℓ-ERF. Then we define the EF⊞ construction with core
cipher E as EF⊞
k
(p), E k (p⊞ f (k))⊞ f (k), where⊞ denotes addition in Z/2
n
Z.
This variantmay be useful in practice, when the core cipher of the construction is no longer seen
as a black box. Because a block cipher typically performs key whitening with sub-keys derived
from k, if it is performedwith an XOR operation, it may be better to combine the output of f with
modular addition, in order to make it non-linear with respect to this whitening4. Conversely,
the original construction is maybe to be preferred when the whitening is done with modular
addition. Note that adding whitening keys with modular addition instead of XOR was already
proposed by Dunkelman et al. as a generalization of the Even-Mansour construction [18].
A second variation exploiting a similar idea is to replace XOR with multiplication in a finite
field.
Definition 9 Let f : {0,1}κ → {0,1}n be an ℓ-ERF. Then we define the EF⊠ construction with core
cipher E as EF⊠
k
(p), E k (p⊠ f (k))⊠ f (k), where⊠ denotes multiplication in F2n .
Although quite slower than XOR or modular addition, multiplication in a finite field mixes its
inputs very thoroughly, which makes it attractive when performance is not critical.
A last variation we suggest is to use even stronger mixing with a decorrelation module [37].
Definition 10 Let f ,g : {0,1}κ → {0,1}n be two ℓ-ERFs. Then we define the EFGDC construction
with core cipher E as EFGDC
k
(p), E k (p⊠ f (k)⊕g(k))⊠ f (k)⊕g(k).
Finally, we can also propose an obvious variation orthogonal to the three above, consisting
in using two (four in the case of EFGDC) different functions to derive the two whitening keys.
4 Alternatively, a concrete instantiation could use f (k) as the unique whitening key.
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It is worthwhile noting that all these variants directly benefit from the proofs for the EF con-
struction, as these did not rely on any specific property of XOR not shared by the alternative
operations used here (in particular they are all invertible). However, the different constructions
are likely to give different levels of security when used in practice, especially when other attacks
than MiTM are considered. For instance, decorrelation modules are expected to provide some
additional protection against classical differential attacks, which XOR or modular addition do
not by themselves.
6 Practical Instantiation
We conclude this work by discussing how to efficiently instantiate the EF construction in prac-
tice. We start by showing how it is possible to use a hash function h as the f function. This is
justified by the fact that such a function is a zero-ERF in the random-oracle model. We note EH
the resulting construction.
Corollary 2 With notations adapted from §§3 and 4, the advantage Adv(D,q1,q2,qh) of an adver-
sary trying to distinguish EHk (p), E k (p⊕h(k))⊕h(k) from a random permutation, where h is a
hash function, is upper-bounded in the random oracle model by:
2−κmax
(
qh, 2
−n
·D
∑
k ′1,k
′
2
min(q1(k
′
1),q2(k
′
2))
)
(2)
for queries q1 and q2 to any two ciphers F k1 and G k2 such that E k =G k1 ◦F k2 .
This is very similar to an alternative to the FX construction proposed by Kilian and Rogaway, and
already mentioned in §1.
From an efficiency point of view, using a call to a (small) hash function as part of the en-
cryption process could be expensive. Therefore, the EH construction might be of little interest
when computational power is limited or when the key has to be regularly changed (for instance
because the cipher is itself used in a hashing mode). However, we believe that there are mean-
ingful applications for block ciphers where none of these restrictions apply, making this type of
instantiation still of interest. It is also worth noting that the input to h/f is of fixed size, and thus
only a “one-shot” compression functionwith a fixed IV hˆ : {0,1}κ→ {0,1}n is actually needed, and
not a full-fledged hash function h : {0,1}∗→ {0,1}n . Finally, it is likely that a smart instantiation
would use synergy between the core of the cipher and the h/ hˆ function; using two completely
unrelated functions for both components would probably not be the simplest way to proceed.
In particular, it seems an interesting option to build the hash function by using the block cipher
E itself in a hashingmode5. If we canmake it so that only one call to the compression function is
needed (this is the case e.g.when the key and block sizes of E are equal), then it is even possible
to build the compression function from E used as a fixed permutation E ′, with all its round keys
independently set to a constant. This can be achieved by e.g. using E in Matyas-Meyer-Oseas
mode, with hˆ(x) then defined as E ′(x)⊕ x. Note that such a construction can be performed with
many current block ciphers, including AES-128. Even though care should be taken before using
any cipher in a hashing mode (this is the case for AES too [35]), the fact that in this case it may
be used with independent round keys may significantly improve its security in that setting (not
least because it rules out meet-in-the-middle attacks such as [35]). Therefore, we believe that
this instantiation strategy is sound, and that it can be applied to many existing ciphers, as well
as being usable for future designs.
5 Obviously, one may also consider reduced-round variants of the same cipher in order to make this step faster. It is
a designer’s role to find a good tradeoff between efficiency and security, and this instantiation strategy makes no
exceptions.
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A Proof of Theorem 2
We use the notations of §4.1.
A.1 TheF Game
In this sub-section, we give a bound for the advantage of an adversary when it is trying to dis-
tinguish U thanks to the answers of queries to the F oracle. We will say that such an adversary
is playing the F game. We first identify these situations when the instantiation of U makes a
difference for the answers to queries to F .
The distinguishing situation. On a query to F k ′1(x), y , then:
1. if k ′1 = k1;
2. and if U (x⊕ f (k1,k2)), c has been previously queried (or ‘def’, for short);
3. and if G−1
k2
(c⊕ f (k1,k2)), y ′ has been previously queried;
then wemust have y = y ′ when U is instantiated by EF, which makes the distinction possible.
Probability of Distinction in Function of the Number of Queries. Our proof revolves around
the combinatorial argument that when the number of oracle queries is known, it is not too hard
to bound the probability of encountering the distinguishing situation for a random choice of k1
and k2. In other words, given the amount of past queries, it is possible to bound the proportion
of the key-space of F and G that will force at least one specific value for an input/output pair of
F when U is instantiated by EF.
From the distinguishing situation, it is straightforward to express the probability of obtaining
an input/output pair for F that can lead to distinction. That is, one that makes distinguishing
possible if F is additionally queried with key k1. This is equal to:
Pr
[
U
−1(z⊕ f (k1,k2))⊕ f (k1,k2) def, G
−1
k2
(z) def
]
, (3)
where z is arbitrary. We can see that the first term in (3) defines the input of a call to F that may
possibly lead to distinction, and the second term defines the corresponding output of such a
call. The full probability of distinguishing U on a query to F k ′1(x) can then be written as:
Pr
[
k ′1 = k1, U
−1(z⊕ f (k1,k2))⊕ f (k1,k2) def, G
−1
k2
(z) def
]
. (4)
We first bound the advantage of an adversary when assuming that f is a zero-ERF. That is,
the output of a call to f is completely random until all of its input is known.
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From (3), we can see that an input/output pair of F for a pair of key candidates (k ′1,k
′
2) may
become defined via two ways: either the adversary made a query to f (k ′1,k
′
2) and corresponding
queries to U and G ; either he has guessed sufficiently many values for the output of f (k ′1,k
′
2)
without querying f , and made many queries to U and G to be able to check and find the right
value. We will say that an adversary behaving according to the first (resp. second) way follows
the first (resp. second) strategy.
The potential advantage (no pun intended) of the second strategy is that it allows to work
separately on the guesses for k1 and k2. This is reminiscent of the classicalMiTMattack; however,
we will see that with the EF construction, this advantage is still considerably reduced because of
the presence of f .
Strategy One. We study the case of an adversary following the first strategy exclusively. We start
by defining a variable τ2, function of k ′1 and k
′
2. We use this variable to bound the probability for
input/output pairs of terms from (3) to be defined for a pair of key candidates (k ′1,k
′
2). We have:
τ2(k
′
1,k
′
2) , 1(D)1(q2(k
′
2))1(qf (k
′
1,k
′
2)). (5)
We then define a variable θ2, function of k ′1, that we use to bound the number of cases defined
for a fixed key candidate k ′1. This will be useful to bound the advantage of the adversary when k
′
1
is the right first key. This variable can be succinctly defined thanks to τ2, and we have:
θ2(k
′
1) , 1(q1(k
′
1))
∑
k ′2
1(τ2(k
′
1,k
′
2)). (6)
It follows that for a right guess k1 of k ′1, the advantage of the adversary can be bounded by
2−κθ2(k1). Consequently, we define a final variableΘ1 as:
Θ1 ,
∑
k ′1
θ2(k
′
1). (7)
This allows us to bound the advantage of an adversary by 2−2κΘ1. If we fully develop Θ1 again,
this yields:
Θ1 , 1(D)
∑
k ′1
1(q1(k
′
1))
∑
k ′2
1(q2(k
′
2))1(qf (k
′
1,k
′
2)). (8)
What is interesting here is that we need at least one call to f for every pair of candidates (k ′1,k
′
2)
for those candidates to contribute to the value ofΘ1. Therefore,we canboundΘ1 by
∑
k ′1,k
′
2
1(qf (k
′
1,k
′
2))
without losing toomuch precision. This gives us the final bound we will use for the advantage of
an adversary playing the F game and following strategy one:
Adv(0,D,q1,q2,qf ) ≤ 2
−2κ
∑
k ′1,k
′
2
1(qf (k
′
1,k
′
2)) = 2
−2κ
·qf . (9)
This means that to gain an advantage of one, an adversary will need at least 22κ queries qf to the
f oracle.
Strategy Two. We now turn our attention to an adversary exclusively following the second strat-
egy. In this case, for the guess of a key candidate k ′1, in order to check a key candidate k
′
2, there
may be many guesses of the value of f (k ′1,k
′
2) to consider to gain a non-marginal advantage. In
the case of strategy two, we redefine the variable τ2 as:
τ2(k
′
1,k
′
2) , 2
−n
·Dq2(k
′
2). (10)
We also redefine θ2 as:
θ2(k
′
1) ,
∑
k ′2
τ2(k
′
1,k
′
2)min
(
1,
q1(k ′1)
q2(k ′2)
)
= 2−n ·D
∑
k ′2
min(q2(k
′
2),q1(k
′
1)). (11)
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In this case we do not have indicator functions as in strategy one anymore, as what becomes
important is the proportion of guesses for f (k1,k2) that were made out of how many possible
values it can take (whereas in the case of strategy one, we explicitly compute f for the couples
(k1,k2), and thus only care if the right one was once considered). We also witness the introduc-
tion of a min term that translates the fact that for a guess of the value of f (·) to be useful in an
attack, it needs to be verifiable form both the plaintext and the ciphertext. If we put it in another
way, the queries q1(k ′1) (resp. q2(k
′
2)) define at most D ·q1(k
′
1) (resp. D ·q2(k
′
2)) differences with
the plaintexts (resp. the ciphertexts); if more differences are definedwith, say, the plaintexts than
with the ciphertexts (because e.g. of more calls to q1 than to q2), some of those differences will
not possibly be checked for thewhole construction, and therebywill not contribute to the attack.
Now we can use θ2 and defineΘ1 to bound the advantage of the adversary as previously; the
only difference will be the full expression forΘ1. In this case it will be:
Θ1 , 2
−n
·D
∑
k ′1
∑
k ′2
min(q2(k
′
2),q1(k
′
1)). (12)
Hence we can bound the advantage of an adversary playing the F game and following strategy
two by:
Adv(0,D,q1,q2,qf ) ≤ 2
−2κ−n
·D
∑
k ′1,k
′
2
min(q2(k
′
2),q1(k
′
1)). (13)
This means that to gain an advantage of one, an adversary will need at least 2
κ+n
D
queries q1 and
q2 to the F and G oracles, those being possibly made independently for the two oracles.
Mixing the two strategies. In order to bound the advantage of an adversary playing the F game
regardless of the strategy it is following, it suffices to combine the bounds (9) and (13) together.
We can do this easily without losing too much precision by taking the maximum of the two.
Indeed we can see that the term qf (k
′
1,k
′
2) does not influence the value of (13), and that the
number of to queries D, q1(k ′1), and q2(k
′
2) does not influence the value of (9) in so far as it is
greater than one. This gives the following result:
Lemma 1 The advantage Adv(0,D,q1,q2,qf ) of an adversary trying to distinguish U by playing
the F game is upper-bounded by:
2−2κmax
(
qf , 2
−n
·D
∑
k ′1,k
′
2
min(q2(k
′
2),q1(k
′
1))
)
. (14)
A.2 TheG Game
This game being exactly symmetrical with the previous one, we only give the result here.
Lemma 2 The advantage Adv(0,D,q1,q2,qf ) of an adversary trying to distinguish U by playing
the G game is upper-bounded by:
2−2κmax
(
qf , 2
−n
·D
∑
k ′1,k
′
2
min(q1(k
′
1),q2(k
′
2))
)
. (15)
A.3 TheU Game
We now consider the game that identifies the situation where queries to U itself may lead to
distinction.
The distinguishing situation. On a query to U (p), c, then:
1. if F k1(p⊕ f (k1,k2)), y has been previously queried;
2. and if G k2(y), z has been previously queried;
then we must have c = z ⊕ f (k1,k2) when U is instantiated with EF, which makes distinction
possible.
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Probability of Distinction in Function of the Number of Queries. Again, we express the proba-
bility of obtaining an input/output pair possibly leading to distinction. This is equal to:
Pr
[
F
−1
k1
(y)⊕ f (k1,k2) def, G k2(y)⊕ f (k1,k2) def
]
. (16)
In this equation, the first (resp. second) term corresponds to an input (resp. output) of a dis-
tinguishing call to U . We can treat this equation in a similar fashion as previously, although we
need to redefine the two strategies.
Strategy One. To compute our bound, we may define an intermediate variable τU , function of
k ′1 and k
′
2, that plays the same role as in the F game. We have:
τU (k
′
1,k
′
2) , 1(q1(k
′
1))1(q2(k
′
2))1(qf (k
′
1,k
′
2)). (17)
For a right guess of k ′1 (resp. k
′
2), it is easy to see that we can bound the advantage of an adversary
by 2−κ
∑
k ′2
τU (k ′1,k
′
2) (resp. 2
−κ∑
k ′1
τU (k ′1,k
′
2)). It ensues that the full advantage of an adversary
playing the U game by following strategy one can be bounded by:
2−2κ
∑
k ′1,k
′
2
τU (k
′
1,k
′
2) ≤ 2
−2κ
∑
k ′1,k
′
2
1(qf (k
′
1,k
′
2)) = 2
−2κ
·qf . (18)
To gain an advantage of 1, an adversary will therefore need at least of the order of 22κ queries to
the f oracle.
Strategy Two. In the case of strategy two, we need to redefine the variable τU . For each query
p to U , only joint queries to F and G−1 with similar differences from p and U (p) respectively
may help to define the terms in 16; and then we have τU defined as:
τU (k
′
1,k
′
2) , 2
−n
·D
∑
p
q1(k
′
1,p)q2(k
′
2,p). (19)
For a right guess of k ′1 (resp. k
′
2) we can use this variable to bound the advantage of an adversary
similarly as for strategy one. It ensues that the full advantage of an adversary playing theU game
by following strategy two can be bounded by:
2−2κ
∑
k ′1,k
′
2
τU (k
′
1,k
′
2) = 2
−2κ−n
·D
∑
k ′1,k
′
2,p
q1(k
′
1,p)q2(k
′
2,p). (20)
To gain an advantage of 1, an adversary will need a workload at least of the order of 2
κ+n
D
queries
to the F and G oracles each, with those possibly being made independently one from another.
This gives us our result for the U game:
Lemma 3 The advantage Adv(0,D,q1,q2,qf ) of an adversary trying to distinguish U by playing
the U game is upper-bounded by:
2−2κmax
(
qf , 2
−n
·D
∑
k ′1,k
′
2,p
q1(k
′
1,p)q2(k
′
2,p)
)
. (21)
A.4 The f Game
The EF construction is defined with f being an ℓ-ERF, but so far we gave bounds for the ad-
vantage of an adversary specifically when ℓ is zero. We claim that taking ℓ greater than zero
decreases the bounds by a factor atmost
(n
ℓ
)
2ℓ, making the construction still relevant if ℓ is small
(for instance, with n = 128, we can take ℓ= 3 and lose around 22 bits of security). We prove this
claim for the F game, but the proof easily generalizes to the other games.
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First we should notice that the only strategy we need to consider is strategy one. Indeed,
whether f is an ℓ-ERF or a zero-ERF has no impact if the value of f (k ′1,k
′
2) is guessed indepen-
dently of (k ′1,k
′
2), because we expect f to have a full range in any case. With this in mind we can
redefine the variable τ2 for strategy one. We have:
τ2(k
′
1,k
′
2), 1(D)1(q2(k
′
2))1
{
qf (k
′′
1 ,k
′′
2 ) | hw(k
′
1||k
′
2⊕k
′′
1 ||k
′′
2 )≤ ℓ
}
. (22)
We can plug this directly into the value ofΘ1 to find :
Θ1 , 1(D)
∑
k ′1
∑
k ′2
1(q1(k
′
1))1(q2(k
′
2))1
{
qf (k
′′
1 ,k
′′
2 ) | hw(k
′
1||k
′
2⊕k
′′
1 ||k
′′
2 )≤ ℓ
}
. (23)
As each query to f (k ′1,k
′
2) yields at most 2
ℓ
(n
ℓ
)
pairs (k ′′1 ,k
′′
2 ) such that 1
{
qf (k
′′
1 ,k
′′
2 ) |
hw(k ′1||k
′
2⊕k
′′
1 ||k
′′
2 )≤ ℓ
}
is not zero, we get the bound:
Lemma 4 The advantage Adv(ℓ,D,q1,q2,qf ) of an adversary trying to distinguish U when fol-
lowing strategy one is upper-bounded by:
2−2κ+ℓ
(
n
ℓ
)
·qf . (24)
A.5 Joining Pieces Together
The proof of theorem 2 is just obtained by combining the results of lemmata 1, 3, 4, and by
remarking that the second term in lemma 3 is upper-bounded by the second term in lemma 1.
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